India: Defense Pact with Sri Lanka - Part 2
The possible 'tilt' in the military balance between the SLA and the LTTE acquires particular significance against the backdrop of the stalled peace process, with both contesting parties refusing to dilute their stated positions. The eventual test of the trajectory of Indo-Sri Lankan relations may, indeed, arise if the Island nation is plunged once more into the vortex of civil war.
Although specific contours of the new 'defence cooperation' have not been disclosed, the general drift was manifested in the October 19, 2004, Press Release of the Sri Lankan Defense ministry, published after a meeting between a five-member Indian delegation, led by Ranjith Issar, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, and Cyril Herath, Lankan Secretary of Defence in Colombo. The Press Release mentioned "bilateral defence cooperation in the field of Military Training, Exchange of military Intelligence and information, Maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries, official visits and bilateral meeting at different levels participation in training programmes, joint military exercises, etc were discussed among other matters." There can be little ambiguity over the potential target of this cooperation.
Tilting the Balance?
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
India has often fumbled in achieving the right recipe of adroitness and tact to maintain a 'friendly' neighbourhood. Part of the problem lies in inept handling and inconsistent policies, over the years, towards issues that have plagued its relatively smaller neighbours. This scenario, however, appears to be evolving somewhat, particularly with respect to India's relations with its southern neighbour, Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, was on a state visit in New Delhi from November 3 to 7, to strengthen Indo-Sri Lankan relations. There was satisfaction on the dynamism and energy of bilateral economic ties as a result of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) of March 2000, which had resulted in bilateral trade between the two countries exceeding US$ 1.5 billion in 2003-04. However, though greater economic cooperation was one of the major items on the agenda of discussions, it was the announcement that a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and a Memorandum Of Understanding on the Rehabilitation of the Airfield in Palaly, Jaffna would be signed between the two Governments on mutually convenient dates, that provoked controversy.
Over the decades of civil conflict between the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), India had put the island on its negative list with respect to military supplies. However, as a result of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in February 2002, Sri Lanka was taken off this list in January 2003. Since then, the idea of a defence cooperation agreement has been in the air, and was first discussed in October 2003, when Ranil Wickremesinghe was the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the National Democratic Alliance was in power in New Delhi. Again, on June 19, 2004, the visiting Sri Lankan delegation, led by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, and Indian officials agreed to expedite the proposed defence cooperation agreement.
Although specific contours of the new 'defence cooperation' have not been disclosed, the general drift was manifested in the October 19, 2004, Press Release of the Sri Lankan Defense ministry, published after a meeting between a five-member Indian delegation, led by Ranjith Issar, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, and Cyril Herath, Lankan Secretary of Defence in Colombo. The Press Release mentioned "bilateral defence cooperation in the field of Military Training, Exchange of military Intelligence and information, Maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries, official visits and bilateral meeting at different levels participation in training programmes, joint military exercises, etc were discussed among other matters." There can be little ambiguity over the potential target of this cooperation.
Over the years, India's policies towards Sri Lanka has fluctuated from the pro-active 'hands-on' approach of the late 1980s, when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was dispatched to island nation, to a distant 'hands-off' orientation after the IPKF withdrew with substantial losses in March 1990. Despite the IPKF's withdrawal, however, cooperation with the Lankan security forces was maintained in view of the perception of the threat that the LTTE posed to India, especially after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, by a LTTE suicide cadre. Since then, India has provided Colombo vital intelligence on the movement of LTTE ships and vessels transporting arms and ammunition, as well as occasionally more forceful interventions, such as the sinking of the M.V. Ahat, a part of the LTTE's shipping fleet, which was intercepted by Indian naval authorities off the Tamil Nadu coast in January 1993. The ship was blown up on the orders of one of the LTTE's leaders, Sathasivam Krishnakumar, alias Kittu, who was on board the vessel, after its interception by Indian Navy vessels.
The fact that the defence equation was moving forward was reiterated by the November 1, 2004, visit of India's Chief of Army Staff, N.C. Vij to Sri Lanka - the first by an Indian Army Chief since the de-induction of the IPKF. After a visit to the forward line at Omanthai in Vavuniya district, Vij had said that, although there was a truce in fighting, the Sri Lankan soldiers needed to be vigilant. Commenting on the proposed Defence Agreement he said it was "of immense importance. It would mutually help procurement of arms, and training. Although the ceasefire is in force, recruitment and boosting the moral of soldiers should continue."
Earlier, in September this year, the Indian Navy Chief, Admiral Arun Prakash had also visited Sri Lanka to discuss, among other things, the threat that the LTTE's naval wing, the Sea Tigers, posed to 'both countries'. The emergence of the Sea Tigers and its growing dominance along Sri Lanka's northern shoreline, with an increasing frequency of skirmishes with Indian fishermen, has been a cause of concern to India. Unconfirmed reports have also indicated that the LTTE may be supplying arms to the Naxalite (Left Wing extremist) groups in the southern parts of the country, off the coastline between the Machilipatnam and Guntur districts in Andhra Pradesh. Restoring security in its Southern waters is consequently of prime importance to the Indian Navy, especially since the success of the Sethusamudram Canal Project in the Palk Bay area hinges on the Indian Navy dealing with the Sri Lankan Navy, rather than a 'third Navy'. [The Sethusamudram project will link the Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar in the South Coast by creating a shipping canal through the Rameswaram Island]
Equally worrisome is the growing LTTE clout near the Trincomalee Harbour, where the Sri Lanka Navy's Northern Headquarters is located. The Sri Lankan Government, on August 9, 2004, officially complained to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that 13 camps of the LTTE, located along the southern mouth of the harbour, had been newly setup, violating the bilateral ceasefire agreement between Colombo and the Tigers. An oil tank complex run by Indian Oil Corporation is located near the harbour, giving an Indian tinge to these anxieties.
The economic content packaged along with the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) adds a crucial dimension to the current bilateral engagement. India has offered a US$ 100 million credit line for the development of Rural Infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka. India is the second highest tourism generating country in Sri Lanka and the number of Sri Lankan Airline flights into various cities in India now stands at 77 per week - the highest number of flights to India by any airline. India has also offered a grant of US$ 7.5 million to build a state-of-the-art Cancer Hospital in Sri Lanka. A second hospital project funded by the Indian Government is located at Dickoya near Kandy, with an investment of Rupees 200 million. In addition, Indian public sector undertakings such as RITES (Rail India Technical and Economic Services Ltd), National Thermal Power Corporation and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., have set up projects in Sri Lanka. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) recently paid the final amount of $45 million for a $75-million deal with the Sri Lankan Government to retail fuel in the island country. Lanka-IOC Pvt. Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of IOC, has taken over a large number of petrol bunks. India is also extending a $100-million credit line for goods and services over a period of 20 years, with a moratorium of five years. This includes a wheat loan of $31 million. In a minor reverse flow, a few Lankan companies, mainly in the confectionary business, would soon be setting up shop in Chennai.
The proposed DCA has naturally roused some anxieties among the LTTE and its sympathisers, and protests against the Agreement have been articulated on both sides of the border. Reacting to the latest developments, LTTE's chief peace negotiator, Anton Balasingham, declared: "Tamil people view that such an agreement is irrelevant during the time of a peace process, suspended though, but altogether not given up and therefore would tilt the military equilibrium, the underlying principle of the ceasefire agreement." P. Sithamparanathan of Sri Lanka's Tamil National Alliance (TNA) stated further, on November 10, that the proposed military pact between India and Sri Lanka might tempt the latter to restart the war against the Tamil Tiger guerrillas, and that Tamils fear "preparations are underway for another war in the island". On the Indian side, Vaiko, the pro-LTTE leader of the MDMK (Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) in the Southern state of Tamil Nadu, met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to express his disapproval.
The possible 'tilt' in the military balance between the SLA and the LTTE acquires particular significance against the backdrop of the stalled peace process, with both contesting parties refusing to dilute their stated positions. The eventual test of the trajectory of Indo-Sri Lankan relations may, indeed, arise if the Island nation is plunged once more into the vortex of civil war.
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Volume 3, No. 18, November 15, 2004
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
India has often fumbled in achieving the right recipe of adroitness and tact to maintain a 'friendly' neighbourhood. Part of the problem lies in inept handling and inconsistent policies, over the years, towards issues that have plagued its relatively smaller neighbours. This scenario, however, appears to be evolving somewhat, particularly with respect to India's relations with its southern neighbour, Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, was on a state visit in New Delhi from November 3 to 7, to strengthen Indo-Sri Lankan relations. There was satisfaction on the dynamism and energy of bilateral economic ties as a result of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) of March 2000, which had resulted in bilateral trade between the two countries exceeding US$ 1.5 billion in 2003-04. However, though greater economic cooperation was one of the major items on the agenda of discussions, it was the announcement that a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and a Memorandum Of Understanding on the Rehabilitation of the Airfield in Palaly, Jaffna would be signed between the two Governments on mutually convenient dates, that provoked controversy.
Over the decades of civil conflict between the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), India had put the island on its negative list with respect to military supplies. However, as a result of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in February 2002, Sri Lanka was taken off this list in January 2003. Since then, the idea of a defence cooperation agreement has been in the air, and was first discussed in October 2003, when Ranil Wickremesinghe was the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the National Democratic Alliance was in power in New Delhi. Again, on June 19, 2004, the visiting Sri Lankan delegation, led by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, and Indian officials agreed to expedite the proposed defence cooperation agreement.
Although specific contours of the new 'defence cooperation' have not been disclosed, the general drift was manifested in the October 19, 2004, Press Release of the Sri Lankan Defense ministry, published after a meeting between a five-member Indian delegation, led by Ranjith Issar, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, and Cyril Herath, Lankan Secretary of Defence in Colombo. The Press Release mentioned "bilateral defence cooperation in the field of Military Training, Exchange of military Intelligence and information, Maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries, official visits and bilateral meeting at different levels participation in training programmes, joint military exercises, etc were discussed among other matters." There can be little ambiguity over the potential target of this cooperation.
Over the years, India's policies towards Sri Lanka has fluctuated from the pro-active 'hands-on' approach of the late 1980s, when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was dispatched to island nation, to a distant 'hands-off' orientation after the IPKF withdrew with substantial losses in March 1990. Despite the IPKF's withdrawal, however, cooperation with the Lankan security forces was maintained in view of the perception of the threat that the LTTE posed to India, especially after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, by a LTTE suicide cadre. Since then, India has provided Colombo vital intelligence on the movement of LTTE ships and vessels transporting arms and ammunition, as well as occasionally more forceful interventions, such as the sinking of the M.V. Ahat, a part of the LTTE's shipping fleet, which was intercepted by Indian naval authorities off the Tamil Nadu coast in January 1993. The ship was blown up on the orders of one of the LTTE's leaders, Sathasivam Krishnakumar, alias Kittu, who was on board the vessel, after its interception by Indian Navy vessels.
The fact that the defence equation was moving forward was reiterated by the November 1, 2004, visit of India's Chief of Army Staff, N.C. Vij to Sri Lanka - the first by an Indian Army Chief since the de-induction of the IPKF. After a visit to the forward line at Omanthai in Vavuniya district, Vij had said that, although there was a truce in fighting, the Sri Lankan soldiers needed to be vigilant. Commenting on the proposed Defence Agreement he said it was "of immense importance. It would mutually help procurement of arms, and training. Although the ceasefire is in force, recruitment and boosting the moral of soldiers should continue."
Earlier, in September this year, the Indian Navy Chief, Admiral Arun Prakash had also visited Sri Lanka to discuss, among other things, the threat that the LTTE's naval wing, the Sea Tigers, posed to 'both countries'. The emergence of the Sea Tigers and its growing dominance along Sri Lanka's northern shoreline, with an increasing frequency of skirmishes with Indian fishermen, has been a cause of concern to India. Unconfirmed reports have also indicated that the LTTE may be supplying arms to the Naxalite (Left Wing extremist) groups in the southern parts of the country, off the coastline between the Machilipatnam and Guntur districts in Andhra Pradesh. Restoring security in its Southern waters is consequently of prime importance to the Indian Navy, especially since the success of the Sethusamudram Canal Project in the Palk Bay area hinges on the Indian Navy dealing with the Sri Lankan Navy, rather than a 'third Navy'. [The Sethusamudram project will link the Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar in the South Coast by creating a shipping canal through the Rameswaram Island]
Equally worrisome is the growing LTTE clout near the Trincomalee Harbour, where the Sri Lanka Navy's Northern Headquarters is located. The Sri Lankan Government, on August 9, 2004, officially complained to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that 13 camps of the LTTE, located along the southern mouth of the harbour, had been newly setup, violating the bilateral ceasefire agreement between Colombo and the Tigers. An oil tank complex run by Indian Oil Corporation is located near the harbour, giving an Indian tinge to these anxieties.
The economic content packaged along with the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) adds a crucial dimension to the current bilateral engagement. India has offered a US$ 100 million credit line for the development of Rural Infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka. India is the second highest tourism generating country in Sri Lanka and the number of Sri Lankan Airline flights into various cities in India now stands at 77 per week - the highest number of flights to India by any airline. India has also offered a grant of US$ 7.5 million to build a state-of-the-art Cancer Hospital in Sri Lanka. A second hospital project funded by the Indian Government is located at Dickoya near Kandy, with an investment of Rupees 200 million. In addition, Indian public sector undertakings such as RITES (Rail India Technical and Economic Services Ltd), National Thermal Power Corporation and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., have set up projects in Sri Lanka. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) recently paid the final amount of $45 million for a $75-million deal with the Sri Lankan Government to retail fuel in the island country. Lanka-IOC Pvt. Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of IOC, has taken over a large number of petrol bunks. India is also extending a $100-million credit line for goods and services over a period of 20 years, with a moratorium of five years. This includes a wheat loan of $31 million. In a minor reverse flow, a few Lankan companies, mainly in the confectionary business, would soon be setting up shop in Chennai.
The proposed DCA has naturally roused some anxieties among the LTTE and its sympathisers, and protests against the Agreement have been articulated on both sides of the border. Reacting to the latest developments, LTTE's chief peace negotiator, Anton Balasingham, declared: "Tamil people view that such an agreement is irrelevant during the time of a peace process, suspended though, but altogether not given up and therefore would tilt the military equilibrium, the underlying principle of the ceasefire agreement." P. Sithamparanathan of Sri Lanka's Tamil National Alliance (TNA) stated further, on November 10, that the proposed military pact between India and Sri Lanka might tempt the latter to restart the war against the Tamil Tiger guerrillas, and that Tamils fear "preparations are underway for another war in the island". On the Indian side, Vaiko, the pro-LTTE leader of the MDMK (Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) in the Southern state of Tamil Nadu, met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to express his disapproval.
The possible 'tilt' in the military balance between the SLA and the LTTE acquires particular significance against the backdrop of the stalled peace process, with both contesting parties refusing to dilute their stated positions. The eventual test of the trajectory of Indo-Sri Lankan relations may, indeed, arise if the Island nation is plunged once more into the vortex of civil war.
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Volume 3, No. 18, November 15, 2004
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